Abstract. We consider a mean field linear-quadratic-Gaussian game with a major player and a large number of minor players parametrized by a continuum set. The mean field generated by the minor players is approximated by a random process depending only on the initial state and the Brownian motion of the major player, and this leads to two limiting optimal control problems with random coefficients, which are solved subject to a consistency requirement on the mean field approximation. The set of decentralized strategies constructed from the limiting control problems has an ε-Nash equilibrium property when applied to the large but finite population model.
Introduction.
Stochastic dynamic games with mean field coupling have experienced intense investigation in recent years; see, e.g., [2, 11, 16, 18, 20, 21, 28, 33, 34] . The players in these models are individually insignificant but they collectively have a significant impact on a particular player. Since all players are comparably small, they may be called peers. To design low-complexity strategies, consistent mean field approximations provide a powerful approach. The fundamental idea is that in the population limit each agent optimally responds to a certain mean field which in turn is replicated by the closed-loop behaviors of the agents. Based on this procedure, the mean field may be determined by a fixed point analysis [16] . In the resulting solution, each agent only needs to know its own state information and the mass effect in the population limit which may be computed offline. This methodology has been applied to decentralized control of coupled nonlinear oscillators subject to random disturbances [34] , human crowd motion [11] , and decentralized charging control for large populations of plug-in electric vehicles [23] . Risk-sensitive costs and robustness issues were considered in [32] . Numerical solutions for coupled Hamilton-Jacobi-Bellman and Fokker-Planck equations in mean field games have been developed in [1] . The survey [6] on differential games presents recent progress in mean field game theory. The technique of consistent mean field approximations is also applicable to mean field social optimization [17] , where each agent does not simply minimize its own cost but solves a modified optimal control problem by taking into account its social impact across the population. The mean field approach has also appeared in anonymous sequential games [19] with a continuum of players individually optimally responding to the mean field. However, the modeling of a continuum of independent processes 1.1. Mean field games with major and minor players. This paper considers the linear-quadratic-Gaussian (LQG) game with a major player A 0 and a population of minor players {A i , 1 ≤ i ≤ N }. At time t ≥ 0, the states of the players A 0 and A i are, respectively, denoted by x 0 (t) and x i (t), 1 ≤ i ≤ N . Let (Ω, F , {F t } t≥0 , P ) be the underlying filtered probability space with the filtration {F t } t≥0 . The dynamics of the N + 1 players are given by a system of linear stochastic differential equations (SDEs) dx 0 (t) = A 0 x 0 (t) + B 0 u 0 (t) + F 0 x (N ) (t) dt + D 0 dW 0 (t), (1.1)
where
x i is the mean field term. The initial states {x j (0), 0 ≤ j ≤ N } are measurable with respect to F 0 and have finite second moments. The states x 0 , x i and controls u 0 , u i are, respectively, n and n 1 dimensional vectors. The noise processes W 0 and W i are n 2 dimensional independent standard Brownian motions adapted to {F t } t≥0 , which are also independent of {x j (0), 0 ≤ j ≤ N }. For simplicity, we may take F t = σ{x j (0), W j (s), 0 ≤ j ≤ N, s ≤ t}, which is the σ-algebra generated by the initial states and the Brownian motions up to time t. The vector θ i ∈ R d is a parameter in the dynamics of player A i . Note that {θ i , i ≥ 1} in (A2) is treated as a deterministic sequence which jointly with {Ex i (0), i ≥ 1} exhibits orderly statistical behavior. Let F N (θ) and F(θ) denote the marginal distribution functions of F N (θ, x) and F(θ, x), respectively, with respect to θ. By (A2), it is clear that {F N (θ), N ≥ 1} converges to F(θ) weakly.
For the reader's convenience, we note some conventions on notation. We use C, C 0 , etc., to denote a generic constant which may change from place to place but does not depend on the population size N . For a vector or matrix V , |V | denotes the Frobenius norm; Δ is the region
, and this notation may be extended to more than two spaces.
The organization of the paper is as follows. Section 1 presents the introduction and formulates the mean field game problem. Section 2 solves two auxiliary stochastic control problems in the mean field limit. The consistency condition for mean field approximations is introduced in section 3, and section 4 shows an asymptotic Nash equilibrium property. Section 5 analyzes a scalar model with numerical solutions. Section 6 concludes the paper.
2.
The limiting control problems with random coefficients. We formulate the auxiliary control problems within the population limit via the approximation of x (N ) by a process z depending linearly on the initial state and the driving noise of the major player. It will be convenient to still refer to them as the control problems of the major and minor players, respectively, although x (N ) in the original dynamics is now replaced by z.
2.1. Two auxiliary optimal control problems. Problem (I): Optimal control of the major player. The dynamics are given by
where the second equation is obtained by replacing x (N ) (t) in (1.1) by z(t). For the proposed mean field approximation, we consider 
Problem (II)
where (fx 0,1 , fx 0,2 , gx 0 ) is determined from the solution of Problem (I). The cost function is given by
The analysis of Problem (I).
By viewing Problem (I) as an optimal control problem with a random coefficient process z, the optimal control may be determined by the standard backward SDE approach [5] . We have the following lemma.
Lemma 2.1.
) is the optimal solution to Problem (I) if and only ifū 0 (t) = R
(ii) Let (ū 0 ,x 0 ) be the optimal pair to Problem (I) and (p 0 , q 0 ) the solution of the above backward SDE. Let δū 0 and δx 0 be the variations ofū 0 andx 0 , respectively, where δū 0 ∈ L 2 F (0, T ; R n1 ). SinceJ 0 (·) is convex in (x 0 , u 0 ) and R 0 > 0,ū 0 is a solution to Problem (I) if and only if the first order variation δJ 0 ofJ 0 satisfies
Combining this identity with p(T ) = 0 and δx 0 (0) = 0 yields 
This implies thatū 0 is optimal if and only ifū 0 (t) = R
To analyze the unique solvability of (2.5), write p 0 (t) = −P 0 (t)x 0 (t) + ν 0 (t), where ν 0 (t) satisfies the terminal condition ν 0 (T ) = 0. Denote
By Ito's formula, it can be shown that (2.5) is equivalent to the forward-backward SDE (2.10)
where ν 0 is now decoupled fromx 0 . By Lemma A.1(ii), we can solve the second equation in (2.10) with a unique solution ν 0 ∈ L 2 F (0, T ; R n ), which in turn determines a unique solutionx 0 ∈ L 2 F (0, T ; R n ) to the first equation. Therefore, (iii) follows from the fact that (2.5) is equivalent to (2.10).
The optimal control law is given in the form
3. An explicit solution of the optimal state process. We intend to find a representation ofx 0 in (2.10) in the form
, and gx 0 ∈ C(Δ, R n×n2 ) are to be determined.
To solve the second equation in (2.10), we denote ζ
The equation of ν 0 in (2.10) may be rewritten as (2.14) where
We continue to solve the first equation in (2.10).
By (2.14) and the representation of z(t),
. Therefore, by (2.18) and Lemma A.1(i) we obtain (2.12), where 
Proof. Using Lemma A.2 instead of Lemma A.1, the proof is similar to that of Lemma 2.1.
Let P θi (t) ≥ 0 be the unique solution of the Riccati equation
Write
By Ito's formula, it is straightforward to show that (2.22) is equivalent to the forwardbackward SDE (2.25)
We will apply Lemma A.2 to representx i (t) in the form 
Note that fx 0,1 , fx 0,2 , and gx 0 are determined in (2.19)-(2.21), and f 1 , f 2 , and g appear in the equation of z. By the above choices of ζ i (t) and λ i (t), the second equation in (2.25) may be written as
Take M i (t) = A θi (t) in (A.8) and denote the resulting solution by Φ θi (t, s). Then by Lemma A.2(ii), we have
, and g νi (t, s) are determined in (2.29)-(2.31). So the first equation in (2.25) may be written as
By Lemma A.2(i) we obtain (2.27), where 
3. The consistency condition. This section introduces the consistency requirement for the mean field approximation, i.e., when the control strategies obtained in section 2 are applied, the mean field replicated by the closed loop in the population limit should coincide with the process z assumed at the beginning. Based on averaging with (2.27), denote
Here, Γ θ,j f j , j = 1, 2, and Λ θ g are, respectively, defined as in (2.34), (2.35), and (2.37) with θ i = θ. The consistent mean field approximation reduces to analyzing the fixed point equation system
which is called the Nash certainty equivalence (NCE) equation system. Denote the product space 
We only prove (iii) while (i) and (ii) may be proved by a similar argument. To analyze Λ, we define some auxiliary operators. For g ∈ C(Δ, R n×n2 ) and θ ∈ Θ, denote
and
In view of (A3) and Remark A.4 (see Appendix A),
Here C does not depend on g.
Note that 
. By replacing the subscript θ by 0, B(θ) by B 0 , and F (θ) by F 0 in (3.5), we define Λ 0,i for i = 1, 2, 3 in a similar manner. It can also be shown that each Λ 0,i is a mapping from C(Δ, R n×n2 ) to C(Δ, R n×n2 ). Note that
s).
This proves (iii).
By the same argument as in the proof of Lemma 3.2, we can show that Γ 
, the sequence of matrix-valued functions {Λ (N ) g, N ≥ 1} is uniformly equicontinuous on Δ. Similarly, we may show that for fixed
the sequences of vector-or matrix-valued functions {Γ
Denote the linear operatorsΓ 0,
, and C(Δ, R n×n2 ), respectively, as follows: 
which are obtained by retaining the linear term of the affine operators Γ 0,j and Λ 0 , respectively.
Corresponding to Γ θ,1 , Γ θ,2 , and Λ θ , define the linear operatorsΓ θ,1 ,Γ θ,2 , and
, and C(Δ, R n×n2 ), respectively, as follows:
, and C(Δ, R n×n2 ) be endowed with the usual supnorms · ∞ so that they are all Banach spaces. Define the linear operators
By Lemma 3.2, we see thatΓ 1 (resp.,Γ 2 andΛ) is a mapping from
. We have the following solvability result for the NCE equation system. Theorem 3.6. Under Assumptions (A1)-(A3), if the norms of the linear operatorsΓ 1 andΛ satisfy Γ 1 < 1 and Λ < 1, there exists a unique solution
Proof. For any
for some α ∈ (0, 1). By Banach fixed point theorem, Γ 1 f 1 = f 1 and Λg = g have a unique solution. Next, we write Γ 2 f 2 = f 2 in the equivalent form
. By Remark 3.5, we may further write an equivalent set of n decoupled equations of the formΓ
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each of which has a unique solution sinceΓ 1 is a contraction. Hence Γ 2 f 2 = f 2 has a unique solution. So (3.4) has a unique solution.
4. Decentralized strategies. Throughout this section we assume that there exists a solution (f 1 , f 2 , g ) ∈ C NCE to the NCE equation system (3.4). Consider  (1.1)-(1.2) . Let the control laws of A 0 and A i , 1 ≤ i ≤ N , be given bŷ
where P 0 (t) and P θi (t) are determined by (2.8) and (2.23), and ν 0 (t) and ν θi (t) are determined by (2.10) and (2.25) with (f 1 , f 2 , g) being a solution to (3.4) . Their explicit solutions are given by (2.14) and (2.28). The control laws (4.1)-(4.2) use the states of the system of N + 1 players and are different from (2.11) and (2.26). Since each strategy depends on the current state information and the major player's Brownian motion via the solution of the backward SDE, we call it a partial state feedback strategy.
After the control laws (4.1)-(4.2) are applied, the dynamics of A 0 and A i may be written as
For further performance estimates, we construct the auxiliary equation system for the N + 1 players
. From (2.12)-(2.21) and (2.27)-(2.38), we havex Since uniform equicontinuity and pointwise convergence imply uniform convergence, by Remarks 3.3 and 3.4 we conclude
The lemma follows. Let (f 1 , f 2 , g) ∈ C NCE be a solution to (3.4) and
We have the error estimate on the mean field approximation. Lemma 4.2. Assume (A1)-(A3) and let z be given by (4.8) . Then 
The second inequality follows from the independence of {W i , i ≥ 1}, the independence of {x i (0), i ≥ 1} and the boundedness of Φ θ (t, s) as implied by Remark A.4. The last inequality follows from (A1).
By using Lemma 4.2 we may further establish the next theorem.
Theorem 4.3. Assume (A1)-(A3).
We have , x 1 , . . . , x N , y W ) . For any j = 0, . . . , N, the admissible control set U j of player A j consists of controls u j of the form f (t, ξ t ) for some y W ∈ U W and some continuous function f , Lipschitz continuous in ξ t . So the control of a player may not be purely in a feedback form since the noise process may be used via y W ; this general form of controls is necessary in order to include the decentralized strategies (4.1)-(4.2). Since the control still uses the players' states, (u 0 , u 1 , . . . , u n ) will be called a set of partial state feedback strategies. Note that U j is not restricted to be decentralized. Given each set of strategies in U 0 × · · · × U N , the closed-loop system has a unique strong solution. Recall
for the N + 1 players is called an ε-Nash equilibrium with respect to the costs
Theorem 4.
Assume (A1)-(A3). Letū 0 andū j be the optimal controls in Problems (I) and (II). For
Proof. See Appendix C. Theorem 4.6. Assume (A1)-(A3). Then the set of controlsû j , 0 ≤ j ≤ N , for the N + 1 players is an ε-Nash equilibrium, i.e., for 0 ≤ j ≤ N,
5. The scalar model and numerical solutions. The dynamics of the N + 1 players are given by
where x 0 , u 0 , w 0 , x i , u i , and w i are all scalar processes. For simplicity, we only let a i be dependent on the players, and furthermore, Ex i (0) = 0 for i ≥ 1. Suppose a i ∈ Θ := [a,ā], which is a compact interval.
The cost functions for A 0 and A i , 1 ≤ i ≤ N , are given by
We introduce the following assumption to replace (A2). Let P 0 (t) ≥ 0 be the solution to the Riccati equatioṅ 
Similarly, for a ∈ [a,ā], let P a (t) ≥ 0 be the solution to the Riccati equatioṅ
and denote Taking into account Ex i (0) = 0, 1 ≤ i ≤ N , we obtain the NCE equation system
Nash certainty equivalence equation system. Following the notation in section 3, for f ∈ C([0, T ], R) and g ∈ C(Δ, R), denote the linear operators
[Γ 0 f ](t) = q 0 b 2 0 h 0 t 0 T s1 e t s 1 a0(s3)ds3 e s 2 s 1 a0(s4)ds4 f (s 2 )ds 2 ds 1 , [Λ 0 g](t, s) = q 0 b 2 0 h 0 t s T s1 e t(5.5) f j (t) = [Γf j ](t) + ϕ j (t), j = 1, 2, g(t, s) = [Λg](t, s) + ψ(t,
s).
Corollary 5.1. The NCE equation system (5.5) has a unique solution if
Proof. By Theorem 3.6, it suffices to show Γ < 1 and Λ < 1.
Since a(t) ≤ a for 0 ≤ t ≤ T , we have 6. Concluding remarks. This paper considers mean field LQG games with a major player and continuum-parametrized minor players. We introduce random mean field approximations, solve the resulting limiting problems as stochastic optimal control with random coefficients, and further obtain decentralized strategies for the players.
For the model analyzed in the paper, the minor players are affected by the major player only via their cost functions. The mean field in the closed loop is nonresponsive to the strategy change of the major player when the minor players implement their ε-Nash strategies.
If the state of the major player appears in the dynamics of each minor player, the mean field will become responsive to the major player's control. More specifically, the strategy change of the major player causes a change in the major player's state and consequently a change in each minor player's state, leading to a change of the mean field. Thus, there is a strong coupling between the major player's strategy change and the mean field evolution. In this case, the design of the major player's strategy should address its ability in simultaneously perturbing its own state process and the mean field; some initial progress has been made in the recent work [27] by introducing a procedure called anticipative variational calculations for the major player's limiting control problem. The analysis in [27] treated homogeneous minor players and it is of interest to generalize it to continuum-parametrized minor players. Downloaded 11/07/12 to 134.117.21.188. Redistribution subject to SIAM license or copyright; see http://www.siam.org/journals/ojsa.php
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Proof. (i) By Fubini's theorem for stochastic integrals,
This gives the desired identities.
(ii) The linear backward SDE has a unique solution [5, 36] .
By (A.6) and Fubini's theorem,
Taking conditional expectation with respect to σ{x
This implies thatν
(s)dsx 0 (0) and , t) , we have ν 0 (t) = Ψ 0 (t, 0)ν 0 (t), ζ 0 (t) = Ψ 0 (t, 0)ζ 0 (t), and μ 0 (t) = Ψ 0 (t, 0)μ 0 (t). Therefore, from (A.5) and (A.7) we have , t) , this completes the proof. Lemma A.2. (i) Let W 0 , W i be two independent standard Brownian motions, which are also independent of R n -valued random vectors x 0 (0) and
, and
and Φ i (·, ·) is the unique solution of 
Proof. The proof of this lemma is similar to that of Lemma A.1 and we omit the details.
Lemma A.3. Let A(θ) and B(θ) be continuous matrix-valued functions on a compact set Θ. For each θ ∈ Θ, let P θ (t) be the solution to the Riccati equation 
Proof. We use the method of Bernoulli substitution to transform (A.9) into linear equations [24, 29] . Let U θ (t) and V θ (t) be determined by
It is clear that U
Since A(·) and B(·) are continuous functions of θ, by [9, Theorem 7.4, p. 29] , U θ (t) and
. By the compactness of Θ, we obtain the desired bound for |P θ (t)|.
Remark A.4. Let Θ be a compact set, and
Appendix B. Proof of Theorem 4.3. Let A 0 (t) and A θi (t) be defined as in (2.9) and (2.24), respectively. By (4.3) and (4.5),
Next, by (4.4) and (4.6), 
By (A3) and Remark A.4,
Hence, for 0 ≤ t ≤ T ,
By Gronwall's inequality,
It follows from (B.1) and Remark A.4 that
Similarly, by virtue of (B.2) and Remark A.4 we have
Combining (B.3)-(B.5), we obtain (4.10).
Appendix C. Proof of Theorems 4.5-4.6. Before proving the two theorems, we give two auxiliary lemmas. Suppose that ξ a (·) and ξ b (·) are random processes which are adapted to the filtration {F t } t≥0 and satisfy (4.8) . Recall that for the optimal control problem with dynamics and cost
the optimal control law isū 0 (t) = R −1 0 B T 0 (−P 0 (t)x 0 (t) + ν 0 (t)), where P 0 (t) and ν 0 (t) are determined by (2.8) and (2.14)-(2.17).
Subsequently, we consider a perturbed version of (C.2)-(C.3) having the dynamics and cost
Lemma C.1. Letū 0 be the optimal control of the control problem (C.2)-(C.3). For any u 0 adapted to {F t } t≥0 , we have
Proof. We write (C.4) in the form
For given x 0 (0) and u 0 , u 0 is a well-defined process adapted to {F t } t≥0 . We construct the control problem with dynamics and cost
dt, wherex 0 (0) = x 0 (0) and u 0 is adapted to {F t } t≥0 . It is clear thatJ 0 (u 0 ) attains its minimum when u 0 ≡ 0 and the corresponding cost is equal toJ 0 (ū 0 ). Hence
Take u 0 = u 0 in (C.8) and letx 0 be the associated solution. Thenx 0 (t) =x 0 (t) + t 0 Φ 0 (t, s)u 0 (s)ds, wherex 0 (t) is the optimal state process of (C.2) as determined in (4.5). This implies
where C is independent of ξ a and (x 0 , u 0 19)-(2.21) . Now we consider a perturbed version of Problem (II). Let the dynamics and cost be given by
The proof of the next lemma is similar to that of Lemma C.1 and hence is omitted.
Lemma C. 
C.3. Proof of
It follows from Theorem 4.3 that
Next, by Schwarz's inequality, 
and subsequently,
C.4. Proof of Theorem 4.6. It suffices to show the first inequality, and the second is evident.
Step 1. The case for the major player A 0 to use an alternative strategy u 0 . Each minor player takes the control lawû i given in (4.2). Denote 
This proves the lower bound in (4.12).
Step 2. The case for any given minor player A i to use an alternative strategy u i . After all players, except A i , apply the control laws given in (4.1)-(4.2), the dynamics of A 0 and A j , j = i, may be written in the form dx 0 (t) = A 0 (t)x 0 (t) + B 0 R Next, denote ξ a (t) = F (θ i )(x (N ) (t)−z(t)) and ξ b (t) = H(x 0 (t)−x 0 (t))+Ĥ(z(t)− x (N ) (t)). Then the dynamics and cost of player A i may be written as 
This proves the lower bound in (4.12) for player A i .
